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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
The State appeals from the district court's order denying the State's motion to 
amend and granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Information. 
2. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
On March 15, 2012, the State filed a criminal complaint against the Defendant 
alleging two counts of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct during the time period of 1988 
through 1996. An arrest warrant was issued and bail was set in the amount of $100,000. 
(R., p. 17-18). The Defendant was arrested and subsequently posted bail. (R., p. 20). 
After performing an appropriate statute of limitations analysis, the State realized that 
prosecution of the alleged crimes was time barred. On April 6, 2012, the State filed a 
Motion to Amend the Complaint. (R., p. 34). 
The Preliminary Hearing was held on May 30, 2012. At the outset of the hearing the 
State presented and filed an Amended Criminal Complaint which alleged one count of 
Statutory Rape 1 as follows: 
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County of Bonner, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of 
Brandy Chicks, a female person, with his penis and where Brandy Chicks 
was under the age of Eighteen (18) years, to-wit: of the age of Fifteen (15), 
and where Defendant at the time of the commission of the act was 
approximately Thirty-four (34) years of age. (emphasis added) (R., p. 44). 
1In its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the State acknowledges 
that the (Amended Complaint and subsequent) Amended Information "does allege facts which, if 
proven, would establish guilt under I.C. 18-6101(1) [sic] (statutory rape)." (R., p. 87). 
1 
Based on the evidence adduced at the Preliminary hearing, the Magistrate held the 
Defendant to answer the charge in the District Court. 
An Information was filed on June 1. (R., p. 59). An Amended Information correcting 
typographical errors was subsequently filed on June 6, 2012, utilizing the same language 
as the Amended Complaint. (R., p. 61 ). 
The Arraignment was held on July 2, 2012, at which time the Defendant entered a 
plea of "not guilty."2 (R., p. 71 ). 
On July 11, 2012, a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Information was filed on behalf 
of the Defendant for the reason that prosecution of the alleged crime was barred by the 
statute of limitations. (R., p. 75). 
A hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was held before the Honorable 
Steve Verby on August 9, 2012. During the hearing the State moved to amend the 
Amended Information. In support, the State argued as follows: 
MR. MARSHALL: My opinion is I have an ethical obligation to first find the 
truth, and then hold people accountable for their actions. That's what the 
State is trying to do here. In order to do so, typically we try to use the least 
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not unlike what Court of Appeals do in terms of their decisions. It is similar. 
Should criminal complaints be more definitive? Perhaps they should. I am 
not here to argue against that. 
2The Defendant objects to the State's inclusion of the alleged victim's accusations within the 
rubric of their "statement of facts." (Br. App., p. 1 ). The Defendant has pied "not guilty'' and is 
presumed to be innocent. 
2 
The case law is for my position in this regard. The motion to amend, 
which I am going to make and is alluded to here in the brief, I think should be 
granted by the Court .... 
THE COURT: We don't have a motion to amend. 
MR. MARSHALL: Your Honor, I would like to make a formal motion in writing 
to amend the information. (8/9/12 Tr., p. 7-8, Ins. 25, 1-15). 
The Prosecuting Attorney then approached the bench and presented a written 
"Motion to Amend Information" "to more specifically allege facts constituting the alleged 
crime for which the Defendant has been charged, Rape, a felony under Idaho Code §18-
1601." (R., p. 103; 8/9/12 Tr., p. 9, L 14-15). 
The Court asked why the motion wasn't "made a long time ago?" (8/9/12 Tr., p. 8, 
Ins. 17-18). In response, the Prosecutor stated: 
MR. MARSHALL: Because, Your Honor, I wanted to see what the Court's 
position was in regard to the motion to dismiss; and then I wanted the Court 
to make a specific ruling on what provisions or what language we could 
proceed under. Does that make sense? 
THE COURT: Not necessarily. I'll wait to hear what Mr. Powell says. 
MR. MARSHALL: I wanted the Court to rule on the motion to dismiss. And 
if the Court rules that we are within the statute of limitations for certain 
allegations that constitute the crime of rape, I wanted the Court to make a 
finding on what those allegations would be that we can proceed on, rather 
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that we can't proceed on those allegations. That was my rationale behind 
that (8/9/12 Tr., p. 8-9, Ins. 19-25; Ins. 1-9). 
Mr. MARSHALL: So we'd ask the Court to, A, deny the motion to dismiss; 
and B, allow the State to amend the information to allege other facts that are 
not based simply on age, but based on coercion, force and lack of consent, 
and proceed, to trial and find what justice is. (8/9/12 Tr., p. 10, Ins. 11-16). 
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The State failed to file a proposed Second Amended Information or to otherwise 
specify the language of the amendment they sought. 
In response to the State's argument, Defense Counsel stated as follows: 
MR. POWELL: Your Honor, first of all, [now] that a motion has actually 
been made, I would make it clear for the record that we object on the 
grounds previously stated. (8/9/12 Tr., p. 13, Ins. 8-11 ). 
In anticipation of the State's Motion, Defense Counsel had previously stated: 
MR. POWELL: First and foremost, I maintain the position that this Court 
does not have jurisdiction to even consider the motion, because the charging 
document is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court. And it cannot 
survive the challenge that's been mounted. 
Secondly, a motion has not been made. 
Third, we ... have never been apprised of what amendment is being 
sought by the prosecutor, nor what alleged facts the amendment would be 
based upon. We do not believe that there are factual grounds which would 
support amendment in this case. Furthermore, we would be biased and 
prejudiced in our due process right to a preliminary hearing with notice on the 
issues, the right to cross-examine witnesses on the issues, the right to bring 
witnesses of our own, the right to make argument as to the issue of probable 
cause or to challenge the magistrate's finding of probable cause. 
In fact there was no finding of probable cause on any basis which Mr. 
Marshall may seek to amend the charge to. And we are prejudiced in that 
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standing the jeopardy of being forced into a trial in front of a jury. I still to this 
day am not sure what the proposed amendment would entail. (8/9/12 Tr., 
pp. 5-6, Ins. 3-25; Ins. 1-3). 
Later, Counsel for the Defendant added: 
MR. POWELL: [D]ue process guarantees that we have the right to be 
apprised of the essential facts constituting the events .... [A] defendant has 
the right to know which theory he's being charged under. And here we had a 
preliminary hearing based on an entirely different theory of law. And 
4 
assuming that the motion should or could be considered by this Court in light 
of the fact that the information is defective, I also don't think its appropriate. 
(8/9/12 Tr., pp. 13-14, Ins. 12-25; Ins. 1-6). 
At the conclusion of the hearing the Court took the matter under advisement. 
(8/9/12 Tr., p. 17, lns.12-13). 
On August 15, 2012, the Court filed its decision denying the State's Motion to 
Amend the Information "because the defendant met his burden of showing his substantial 
rights would be prejudiced by the amendment" and granting the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss "because the statute of limitations ran on the crime charged approximately ten (10) 
years ago." (R., p. 105). In dismissing the charge without prejudice, the Court stated that 
"if the prosecution concludes there are sufficient facts to charge Mr. Blankenship with 
Forcible Rape, it can pursue this new charge in accordance with the requirements of due 
process." (R., p. 113). On September 19, 2012, the State filed its Notice of Appeal. (R., p. 
121). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The State frames the issue as follows: 
Did the district court apply an incorrect legal standard and, therefore, abuse is 
discretion by dismissing the Information rather than allowing an amendment? 
The Defendant believes the issue as framed by the State is incomplete in that it fails 
to fairly incorporate the scope of issues presented for review. The Defendant contends 
that the issue presented on appeaf should be stated as follows: 
Did the district court err in denying the State's motion to amend? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
THE STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND AND WAS THEREFORE CORRECT 
IN DENYING IT. 
Evidence that a prosecutable act was committed within the state of Idaho is a 
jurisdictional requisite. I.C. 19-301. Criminal charging documents serve to provide a 
jurisdictional grounding for the court to hear the case. State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891, 292 
P.3d 282, 284 (Ct. App. 2012). Because the information provides subject matter 
jurisdiction to the district court, the district court's jurisdictional power depends on the 
charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge. State v. Stewart-Meyers, 
145 Idaho 605, 606, 181 P .3d 531 (Ct. App. 2008). A jurisdictional defect exists where the 
alleged facts show on their face that the court has no jurisdiction of the offense charged. 
Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 747 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 115 Idaho 315,766 
P.2d 785 (1988), overruled on other grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 
660 (1992). 
Statutes of limitation in criminal cases create a bar to prosecution. State v. 
Steensland, 33 Idaho 529, 195 P. 1080, 1080 (1921 ). The time ,,vithin >vvhich an offense is 
committed becomes a jurisdictional fact in all cases subject to limitation. Steensland, 195 
P. at 1081. A defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court "if the face of the 
indictment shows that any prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. This is 
because the defect is incurable and irreparable. Limitations is an absolute bar to 
prosecution. There is no point in wasting scarce judicial and societal resources or putting 
6 
the defendant to great expense, inconvenience, and anxiety if the ultimate result is never in 
question." Phillips v. State, 362 S.W.3d 606, 617 n. 64 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011 ). 
Here, based on the allegations contained in the State's Amended Information, the 
District Court found that "the statute of limitations ran in the 'Spring' of 2002, approximately 
ten (10) years ago, and the prosecution of this case is prohibited." (R., p. 112). This 
finding is not challenged on appeal. (Br. App., p. 6, n. 3). 
The charging document at issue fails to set forth facts which, even if true, constitute 
a prosecutable act under the laws of this state. Under these circumstances, the Amended 
Information failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the District Court to even consider 
the State's Motion to Amend. For this reason the case was properly dismissed.3 
2. THE STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND, BY ITS OWN TERMS, WAS 
RENDERED MOOT BY THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
At the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the State presented a written 
"Motion to Amend Information." (R., 103). The Motion failed to specify the grounds upon 
which it was based or the relief or order sought.4 The prosecutor orally elaborated on the 
nature of the State's motion. He asked that the District Court first consider the Defendant's 
motion to dismiss and then rule on the State's motion to amend. 
3In a different context, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that "a time-barred notice 
of appeal does not confer jurisdiction on the appellate courts .... " Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 
385, 256 P .3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
4The Motion sought to amend "to more specifically allege facts constituting the alleged crime 
for which the Defendant has been charged, Rape, a felony under Idaho Code §18-1601." 
7 
MR. MARSHALL: Because, Your Honor, I wanted to see what the Court's 
position was in regard to the motion to dismiss; and then I wanted the Court 
to make a specific ruling on what provisions or what language we could 
proceed under. Does that make sense? 
THE COURT: Not necessarily. I'll wait to hear what Mr. Powell says. 
MR. MARSHALL: I wanted the Court to rule on the motion to dismiss. And 
if the Court rules that we are within the statute of limitations for certain 
allegations that constitute the crime of rape, I wanted the Court to make a 
finding on what those a/legations would be that we can proceed on, rather 
than simply filing another amended information and having the Court find 
mar wef can't proceed on those allegaffons. Tfiaf was mY ra.Uonale behina 
that. (8/9/12 Tr., p. 8-9, Ins. 19-25; Ins. 1-9). 
The District Court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss. As a result, and 
based on the terms of the State's Motion, the Motion to Amend was thereby rendered 
moot. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT ALLOWING 
THE STATE TO AMEND WOULD PREJUDICE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The decision of whether to allow the State to amend the information rests in the trial 
court's discretion, subject to the caveats contained in I.C.R. 7(e) which provides: 
The court may permit ... an information ... to be amended at any time 
h9f,...,-e +he r\t"'l""\C"Ol"'\I ,+il""\n t"'el."+l." j,f t""\I""\ ""rlrli+i"-1""\.r"\I "' ... ,..,i.f.fru"'l""\r"\+ -..f.f-."'-- :- -h-...---..,.J 
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and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. (Emphasis 
added). 
After conducting its analysis, the District Court concluded that "[u]nder the circumstances 
presented in this case ... it is apparent that such an amendment, taking place after Mr. 
Blankenship prepared for a Statutory Rape charge, prejudices his substantial right to due 
8 
process of law5 as guaranteed by the United States Constitution." (R., p. 110). 
Due process requires an opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair hearing 
before an impartial tribunal. Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 153 Idaho 200,280 P.3d 
703, 707 (2012). In the context of a felony prosecuted by criminal complaint in Idaho, a 
defendant is entitled to a Preliminary Hearing6 before being bound over from the 
Magistrate's Division to the District Court to face charges. I.C.R. 5.1 (a). The standards for 
preliminary hearings are set forth under !.C.R. 5.1 (b) which provides that: 
If from the evidence the magistrate determines that a public offense has 
been committed and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe that 
the defendant committed such offense, the magistrate shall forthwith hold 
the defendant to answer in the district court. The finding of probable cause 
shall be based upon substantial evidence upon every material element of 
the offense charged. . . . The defendant shall be entitled to cross-examine 
witnesses produced against the defendant at the hearing and may introduce 
evidence in defendant's own behalf. 
Furthermore, a Defendant who is held to answer to a criminal charge may challenge the 
sufficiency of evidence educed at the preliminary examination by a motion to dismiss the 
5On Appeal, the State's focus on the Confrontation Clause and the right to cross examine is 
misplaced. The District Court's ruling made no reference to the Confrontation Clause and the right 
to cross examine at the preliminary hearing is set forth in !.C.R. 5.1 (b). 
6See, State v. Stewart-Meyers, 145 Idaho 605,607, n. 1, 181 P.3d 531 (Ct. App. 2008) citing 
Goodwin v. Page, 296 F.Supp. 1205, 1211 (E.D. Okla. 1969) (holding a preliminary hearing to be a 
"vital process" such that the denial of a hearing violates due process); Buckley v. Hall, 215 Mo. 93, 
114 S.W. 954, 955 (1908) (declaring that whether or not a defendant received a preliminary hearing 
goes to the regularity of the previous proceedings); State v. Oconnor, 31 N.C.App. 518, 229 S.E.2d 
705 (1976) (analyzing denial of preliminary hearing as matter of due process); 22 C.J.S. Criminal 
Law § 456 (2006) (The failure to give a preliminary hearing or examination is not a jurisdictional 
defect but it may be cause for reversing or setting aside a conviction.). See also Grayv. Raines, 662 
F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1981 ). 
9 
commitment. Pursuant to I.C. 19-81 SA: 
If the district judge finds that the magistrate has held the defendant to 
answer without reasonable or probable cause to believe that the defendant 
has committed the crime for which he was held to answer . . . he shall 
dismiss the complaint, commitment or information and order the defendant 
discharged. 
Here, the Amended Complaint filed at the time of the preliminary hearing alleged 
statutory rape. Criminal charging documents serve to provide notice of the charge to the 
defendant against which he must defend hirnself. State V. Olin, 153 Idaho 891, 292 P:sa 
282, 284 (Ct. App. 2012). 7 In this case a preliminary hearing was had, and the Defendant 
was held to answer for the charge of statutory rape. The Defendant had no notice to 
defend, and no basis to cross examine the State's witnesses or call witnesses of his own 
on allegations of forcible rape.8 The lack of notice prejudiced the Defendant in his right to 
a fair hearing and to require the state to establish probable cause based on substantial 
evidence of every material element of the offense charged. 
Furthermore, the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing did not provide 
substantial evidence of every material element of the crime of forcible rape. Forcible rape 
7 A criminal defendant is entitled to be apprised by the charging instrument not only of the 
name of the offense charged but in general terms of the manner in which it is alleged to have been 
committed. State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 33 P.3d 318 (Idaho App. 2001)(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the facts alleged, rather than the designation of the offense, control. State v. Mickey, 
27 Idaho 626, 150 P. 39, 40 (1915). 
81n addition to providing notice, the offense charged and manner in which it is alleged to have 
been committed serve to circumscribe the scope of relevant evidence. Pursuant to I.R.E. 401, 
"[r]elevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
10 
is defined as penetration of a female by the perpetrator's penis under circumstances 
"[w]here she resists but her resistance is overcome by force or violence." I.C. 18-6101 (3). 
Here, there the State produced no evidence of verbal or physical resistance9 by the alleged 
victim nor of force or violence 10 by the defendant in overcoming resistance. 
In denying the State's Motion to Amend, the District Court stated that "pursuant to 
the requirement of Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e), [the Defendant] met his burden of showing 
that his substantial rights would be prejudiced by the amendment of the Information." (R., 
p. 111). The Court reasoned that the "right to due process is a 'substantial right'11 within 
the meaning of I.C. 19-1420 and Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e)." (R., p. 109). The Court did not 
err in this regard. 
4. THE STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND LACKED SPECIFICITY AND WAS 
THEREFORE PROPERLY DENIED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Although the District Court did not reach the issue, the decision to deny the State's 
Motion to Amend is also appropriate for the reason that the State's Motion lacked 
9To the contrary, the alleged victim testified that "I didn't say anything. I shut down." and "I 
didn't do anything." (8/9/12 Tr., p. 15, Ins. 9-14 (quoting the transcript of the Preliminary Hearing). 
10In it's brief, the State cites testimony of the alleged victim that the defendant penetrated her 
"very forcefully." (Br. App., p. 12). In State v. Jones, Docket No. 39519 (Idaho 2013), the Idaho 
Supreme Court adopted the extrinsic force standard. Under that standard, "some force beyond that 
which is inherent in the sexual act is required for a charge of forcible rape." "The force to which 
reference is made is not the force inherent in the .act of penetration but the force used or threatened 
to overcome or prevent resistance by the female." Id. (quoting State v. McKnight, 77 4 P .2d 532, 
535,. (Wash. App. 1989). 
11The State cites State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, 31, 266 P .3d, 506 (Ct. App. 2011) for the 
proposition that "the relevant inquiry is whether the amendment would prejudice the defendant at 
trial." The Defendant disagrees that the case stands for this proposition. 
11 
specificity. 
In the "conclusion" section of its appellate brief, the State requests that the case be 
"remanded for further proceedings on the Second Amended Information." (Br. App., p., 
13). In doing so the State ignores the fact that a proposed Second Amended Information 
was never presented to the District Court. The State's "Motion to Amend Information" 
which was filed with the District Court also failed to specify the language of the amendment 
being sought. 12 Rather, the State called upon the Court to fashion the language of a 
Second Amended Information. In that regard, the prosecutor stated: 
MR. MARSHALL: Because, Your Honor, I wanted to see what the Court's 
position was in regard to the motion to dismiss; and then I wanted the Court 
to make a specific ruling on what provisions or what language we could 
proceed under. Does that make sense? 
THE COURT: Not necessarily. I'll wait to hear what Mr. Powell says. 
MR. MARSHALL: I wanted the Court to rule on the motion to dismiss. And 
if the Court rules that we are within the statute of limitations for certain 
allegations that constitute the crime of rape, I wanted the Court to make a 
finding on what those a/legations would be that we can proceed on, rather 
than simply filing another amended information and having the Court find 
that we can't proceed on those allegations. (8/9/12 Tr., p. 8-9, Ins. 19-25; Ins. 
1-9). 
It is the responsibility of the party moving to amend to identify the language of the 
proposed amendment. I.C.R. 47 states, in pertinent part: 
12An information may not merely state the general crime for which a defendant is charged. 
An information is legally sufficient only if it contains a plain, concise and definite written statement of 
the essential facts constituting the offense charged, in such a manner as to enable a person of 
common understanding to know what is intended in the charge. State. v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54,740 
P.2d 1039 (Ct. App. 1987). 
12 
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. D It shall state the 
grounds upon which the motion is made and shall set forth the relief or 
order sought. (Emphasis added). 
Here, the State's Motion to Amend Information failed to specify the relief or order 
sought. Rather, the State solicited the assistance of the District Court in fashioning the 
allegations for a Second Amended Information. This is not the role of the court. For this 
reason the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's Motion to 
Amend. 
5. THE DISTRICT COURT MAY EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO DENY 
THE STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND. 
The decision of whether to allow the State to amend the information rests in the trial 
court's discretion subject to the caveats contained in I.C.R. 7(e). The rule states, in part, 
that the court may permit an amendment if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced. 
In the "conclusion" section of its appellate brief, the State requests that the case be 
"remanded for further proceedings on the Second Amended Information." (Br. App., p., 
13). This is inappropriate. Even if the District Court's decision to deny the State's Motion 
to Amend were not affirmed upon one of the foregoing grounds, the decision of whether to 
permit the amendment still rests in the sound discretion of the District Court. Although the 
Court recognized the issue as one of discretion, it never had occasion to exercise that 
discretion based on the finding that substantial rights of the Defendant would be prejudiced 
by granting the State's Motion to Amend. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court did not err in denying the State's Motion to Amend the Amended 
Information. 
DATED this~ of June, 2013. 
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